By Javier Surasky
Introduction
AI is more
than finding the right algorithms for each task and combining them. It involves
issues of geopolitics, energy, sovereignty, material infrastructures, and
supply chains, among others. Given current events in the Middle East, we ask:
Can we think of Taiwan as the Strait of Hormuz of AI?
Our
comparison is meant to be analytical, not literal. While the Strait of Hormuz
and Taiwan differ greatly in geography and context, the analogy highlights that
the Strait of Hormuz is critical to the global energy economy, much as Taiwan
is central to advanced AI chip production (US-EIA, 2025, p. 1; OECD, 2025a, p.
15). Both are centers of geopolitical tension, involving multiple actors and
putting the United States and China in direct opposition.
The concept of chokepoint
The analogy
between the Strait of Hormuz and the island of Taiwan that we develop here is
based on considering both spaces as chokepoints: points whose disruption would
have systemic effects beyond their geographical dimensions.
In the case
of Hormuz, the EIA notes that in 2024, approximately 20% of global petroleum
liquids consumption and one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade passed
through it. It is therefore a critical bottleneck for global energy security
(US-EIA, 2025, p. 1).
In the case
of Taiwan, the chokepoint is not a maritime corridor, but the extreme
concentration of chip manufacturing. The OECD notes that in 2024 TSMC
controlled more than 60% of the global contract chip manufacturing market, and
close to 90% of the production of cutting-edge chips, to which it must still be
added that: “For AI accelerator chips, TSMC leadership in 2024 disclosed that
99% of the world’s AI accelerators are made with TSMC technologies” (OECD,
2025a, p. 15).
Just as the
Strait of Hormuz is a transit bottleneck for global energy trade, Taiwan is a
production bottleneck. Both constitute small areas of the planet that generate
extremely high levels of international dependence, and in both cases, the
dependence created cannot be resolved quickly in the face of deep disruptions.
Geopolitics: the United States, China, and the Taiwan issue
Both the
Strait of Hormuz and Taiwan are areas of strong interstate rivalry: “Despite
being the world’s most crucial energy chokepoint transiting some 21% of global
petroleum liquid consumption, the Strait of Hormuz (the Strait) is one of the
environments where the US and Iran routinely interact with high potential of a
direct collision” (Divsallar, 2022, p. 2). That clash, of course, has ceased to
be merely potential.
While
“American companies still rely heavily on Taiwan-made chips, and this
dependence has only increased in recent years with rapid advancements in
artificial intelligence…” (Templeman, 2026, p. 4), China claims the island,
which has a strong independence movement, as its own territory: “Seizing Taiwan
would, of course, all of a sudden alter the whole picture and, conversely, make
American, European, and Japanese industries heavily dependent on Chinese
semiconductor manufacturing, which in turn would give the People’s Republic
considerable geo-economic leverage against its adversaries and give it the
ability to threaten them with chip shortages and to increase prices, thereby
creating inflationary pressure” (Somers, 2023, p. 50).
The
interruption of the passage of merchant vessels through the Strait of Hormuz
produces amplified effects through increases in energy prices, logistical
costs, and associated inflationary pressures. In Taiwan, a similar disruption
would trigger a cascade effect across semiconductors, computing capacity, and
technological competitiveness, affecting, first and foremost, the world’s
strongest economies (US-EIA, 2025, p. 1; OECD, 2025a, p. 15).
The limits of the analogy
Despite
these parallels, the analogy has clear limits.
Hormuz is a
physical passage for critical goods. Taiwan, instead, is a territory hosting a
key part of the productive capacity of a strategic industry: AI. The risk in
the Strait of Hormuz is mainly about a possible transit blockade, now partially
implemented. In Taiwan, risks are broader and may include military conflict
(with or without an international character), a blockade, political coercion,
or disruption of infrastructure or logistics.
Taiwan is
the largest AI industrial chokepoint, but it is not the Strait of Hormuz in the
strict sense, which does not detract from the heuristic value of the parallel,
as it compels us to consider AI as a technology anchored in materiality that is
also a major energy consumer. Hormuz and Taiwan are closer than they may appear
to an untrained eye, and we are not referring to distances in kilometers (some
6,500 kilometers): the International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global
electricity consumption by data centers could reach close to 945 TWh in 2030
(almost double the current level) as a consequence of the push of AI (IEA,
2025, p. 49).
Thinking of
Taiwan as a functional analogy to the Strait of Hormuz in the field of AI helps
us connect those points.
Conclusions
The answer
to the initial question could be something like: “Taiwan can be considered the
closest functional equivalent to the Strait of Hormuz in terms of energy
transport, but from an AI perspective.”
Even though
Taiwan does not channel a flow, as the Strait of Hormuz does, it concentrates
industrial capacity that makes it a bottleneck for technological and digital
manufacturing, especially advanced AI chips.
Despite
this difference, we have identified several similarities that allow us to
define a sphere of strategic vulnerability for AI. Moreover, we can venture
that if the geopolitics of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first were largely marked by the control and use of energy chokepoints,
that of the advanced twenty-first century is increasingly concerned with
digital, industrial, and computational chokepoints, among which Taiwan occupies
a central place.
References
Divsallar,
A. (2022). Shifting Threats and Strategic Adjustment in Iran’s Foreign Policy:
The case of Strait of Hormuz, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 49(5),
873–895 https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2021.1874873
IEA (2025).
Energy and AI. https://www.iea.org/reports/energy-and-ai
OECD
(2025a). Competition in artificial intelligence infrastructure. OECD
Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/11/competition-in-artificial-intelligence-infrastructure_69319aee/623d1874-en.pdf
OECD
(2025b). The Ocean Economy to 2050. OECD Publishing. https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/publications/reports/2025/03/the-ocean-economy-to-2050_e3f6a132/a9096fb1-en.pdf
Somers, W.
(2023). The State of Taiwan. From International Law to Geopolitics.
Brill/Nijhoff.
Templeman,
K. (2026, March 20). Thinking through America’s baseline priorities on Taiwan.
Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/thinking-through-americas-baseline-priorities-on-taiwan/
US-EIA (2025, June 16). Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint. https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504