By Javier Surasky
A Spanish
version (ES) will be available next Thursday
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We already know that artificial intelligence is not an immaterial technology. Its operation depends on a physical infrastructure made up of chips, servers, data centers, energy, and connectivity networks. Among these components, submarine cables occupy a central place: they are the routes through which much of the world’s data traffic flows, and for that reason they have become decisive pieces for thinking about digital geopolitics and the competition for technological power.
The Material Infrastructure of Artificial Intelligence
Everything
AI does rests on a physical foundation that is often left out of public debate.
There is a great deal of talk about models, algorithms, computing capacity, and data centers, but far less about the material routes that allow data to move
between continents, markets, governments, and users.
The fuel of
the cloud is a material network of fiber-optic cables laid beneath the sea.
These
cables are the channel through which data moves quickly, securely, and
resiliently. According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
submarine cables carry approximately 99% of global internet traffic and support
critical services such as financial transactions, government communications,
and cloud computing.
Submarine Cables: The Physical Network of the Cloud
As AI
expands and begins to be integrated into basic services such as health,
education, transportation, and defense, international connectivity comes to
occupy a decisive place in the distribution of digital power. Submarine cables
are, at the same time, technical infrastructure and geopolitical
infrastructure.
If digital sovereignty is related to control over data, the regulation of technological
risks, and the geographic location of servers, it must also include an
additional question: where does that data move? The regions they cross, the
points where traffic concentrates, and the consequences of a possible
disruption of digital routes are central elements for assessing a state’s
technological autonomy.
Submarine
cables cross geographies exposed to geopolitical tensions, regional conflicts,
maritime accidents, natural disasters, and disputes over critical
infrastructure. Although a cable cut does not necessarily imply an act of
sabotage, its effects can be strategic: increased latency, degraded services,
interrupted operations, and pressure on alternative routes that must absorb
displaced traffic.
This is
more common than is usually assumed. The ITU established the International
Cable Protection Committee, an international body dedicated to strengthening
the resilience of these cables, and has reported that between 150 and 200
submarine cable failures occur each year. Most are caused by human activity,
such as fishing and ships’ anchors dragging across cables, in addition to
natural risks, abrasion, and equipment failures. This requires around three
repairs every week.
AI and the Pressure on Global Connectivity
Demand for data transmission has been growing at very high rates for years.
- Cisco
stated as early as 2018 that global IP traffic would rise from 122 exabytes per month in 2017 to an estimated 396 exabytes per month in 2022. It was right.
- TeleGeography
(2026) notes that bandwidth demand almost doubled between 2020 and 2022, and
that in 2024 it was still growing at a year-on-year rate of 29%. It also
estimates that international bandwidth used by content providers, including AI
platforms and new specialized computing providers, could increase ninefold
between 2025 and 2035.
- In 2024,
content and cloud networks accounted for almost three quarters of all
international bandwidth demand. According to TeleGeography (2026), companies
such as Google, Meta, Microsoft, and Amazon account for at least 80% of demand
on transatlantic, transpacific, and intra-Asian routes.
Evolution of International Bandwidth Demand: 2020–2024
|
Year |
Used international bandwidth demand |
Annual growth |
|
2020 |
~2.1 Pbps |
45% |
|
2021 |
~2.8 Pbps |
~33% |
|
2022 |
~3.9 Pbps |
~35% |
|
2023 |
~5.1 Pbps |
~30% |
|
2024 |
>6.4 Pbps |
29% |
Based on TeleGeography’s report The State of
the Network, 2026 Edition.
This
reality makes it necessary to consider the capacity to move data as a necessary
variable for thinking about digital geopolitics. If AI power is tied to the
capacity to process information, it also depends on the capacity to move it.
The routes that make that possible are therefore strategic infrastructure.
Digital Sovereignty and Critical Infrastructure
This forces
us to broaden the idea of digital sovereignty. A country may have data
protection laws, national AI strategies, and claims of technological autonomy.
But if it depends on only a few international connectivity routes, external
cloud providers, and vulnerable landing points, its digital sovereignty will be
limited, because it is now as much a regulatory issue as an infrastructural
one. Exercising it requires redundancy, route diversity, security at cable
landing points, repair capacity, maritime cooperation, investment in regional
connectivity, and risk assessment in critical corridors.
These
elements connect political geography with digital governance. That is why the
European Commission already treats the security and resilience of submarine
cables as a priority and, in February 2024, adopted Recommendation (EU)2024/779 on secure and resilient submarine cable infrastructures, aimed at
improving coordination, governance, and financing to protect this
infrastructure.
Data Routes, Vulnerability, and Geopolitical Power
The case of
the Persian Gulf illustrates this situation well. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
Emirates, and other regional actors are competing to position themselves as
global AI hubs. They have the capital, energy, technological ambition, and
political will to do so. However, their aspirations are tied to connectivity
routes that cross highly sensitive areas, as is now the case with the Red Sea
and the Strait of Hormuz.
Given that
factor, can the region guarantee the stability of the connectivity it needs to
position itself globally as a digital technology hub? The question arises when
connectivity is integrated into geopolitical analysis. It also reveals a key
point: even in the “ethereal” economy of AI, location matters. Digitalization
does not erase geography; it reconfigures it.
A country
that depends on only a few international connectivity routes, or on unstable or
vulnerable routes, faces a constraint on digital sovereignty that is not only
regulatory, but also infrastructural.
This is
precisely what Chile is trying to avoid by positioning itself as a gateway to
Latin America. The Humboldt Cable project, led by Google together with the
Chilean government and French Polynesia, seeks to connect Chile, French
Polynesia, and Australia, creating the first direct submarine route between
South America and Asia-Pacific through a 14,800-kilometer cable, with
operations expected to begin in 2027.
Conclusion
For AI,
submarine data transmission cables have become what maritime routes were for industrial trade, and what oil pipelines are for the oil industry, in a world whose industrial production historically depended on fossil fuel
consumption.
These veins
and arteries that form the circulatory system of AI data will define new
divisions of roles in the global data economy. They are already part of the
struggles over global power, but they should also occupy a more visible place
in discussions about development, connectivity, and technological autonomy.
Because of
their functions, transnational scale, and impact on development prospects, the
deployment and management of submarine cables cannot be left in the hands of
private actors, but because of their costs and technical challenges, they also
exceed the capacities of national governments. Sooner or later, it will be
necessary to define a clear logic for public-private partnerships and to begin
considering these cables as global public goods.
References
TeleGeography (2026). The State of the Network, 2026 Edition.