Fifth Straw Poll to Select the Next UN Secretary-General

By Javier Surasky

Date: October 7, 2026

Empty Security Council chamber under cool teal lighting, evoking uncertainty in the UN Secretary-General selection.

Disalaignment and disorientation

The fifth straw poll to select the person who will succeed António Guterres at the head of the United Nations was held today and keeps Rebeca Grynspan as the candidate with the highest number of positive votes, although it weakens the position she had reached in the previous round. Meanwhile, the person who had been positioned as her main competitor, Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, suffers a major setback.

If we take the result of the new straw poll and compare it with the one obtained just a few weeks ago, the difference is enormous:

Result of the fifth straw poll and comparison with the previous round

Candidacy	E	D	N	Δ encourage	Δ discourage	Δ no opinion
Rebeca Grynspan	9	6	0	−1	+3	−2
Rafael Grossi	6	7	2	−2	0	+2
Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett	5	9	1	−3	+3	0
Macky Sall	5	10	0	0	+1	−1
María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés	3	9	3	0	−1	+1
Olara Otunnu	3	12	0	−2	+4	−2
Ivonne A-Baki	0	14	1	−1	+3	−2

Note: E= Engourage; D= Discourage; N= No opinion
Source: author’s elaboration based on data from the fifth straw poll by 1 for 8 billion (2026).

As I have pointed out in the previous posts on this issue, I consider it a mistake to place the candidates in a “ranking” of their chances of being elected based only on their positive votes, given the existence of a second variable: the absence of vetoes, which cannot be observed until colored ballots begin to be used to distinguish the votes of permanent members from those cast by non-permanent members. That situation has not changed.

To deal with that uncertainty, since the analysis of the first straw poll I have been applying a combinatorial mathematics mechanism whose assumptions and limits are explained in that first analysis. The mechanism makes it possible to estimate the combinatorial possibility that a candidacy is not facing a negative vote from any of the five permanent members. Here, the impact of the change in votes for Grynspan between the two straw polls becomes clear:

Possibility that no permanent member of the Security Council voted against

Candidacy	Indicator in the fourth poll	Indicator in the fifth poll
Rebeca Grynspan	26.4%	4.2%
Rafael Grossi	1.9%	1.9%
Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett	4.2%	0.2%
Macky Sall	0.2%	0.03%
María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés	0.03%	0.2%
Olara Otunnu	0.7%	0%
Ivonne A-Baki	0%	0%

Source: author’s elaboration.

Note: The changes compare the October 7 poll with the fourth round, held on September 29. The ballots remain secret and undifferentiated between permanent and non-permanent members. The variations are net balances and do not make it possible to reconstruct how each Council member voted or to claim that a given vote moved from one category to another.

Let us look in some detail at what we find for each candidacy, because this new straw poll contains a great deal of information:

Rebeca Grynspan

The Costa Rican candidate moves from ten to nine encourage votes and doubles her discourage votes, from three to six, leaving her with no no-opinion votes. This increases uncertainty about the origin of the opposition she faces.

Her latest interventions seem to show that she is already speaking clearly to a permanent member: “Soy una reformadora” (“I am a reformer”), published on October 3; “Una ONU que funcione” (“A UN that works”), from October 5; and “Reformar para cumplir” (“Reform for delivery”), published today. The sustained emphasis on her capacity to reform institutions is hardly accidental.

She remains the only candidate to reach the threshold of nine encourage votes and the one receiving the fewest discourage votes, but the 9-6-0 result in this round is a setback compared with the 10-3-2 of the previous one. She no longer has immediate arithmetic room to sustain the floor of votes she needs. The most complicated point lies in the change in the possibility that none of the votes against her comes from a permanent member, which falls from 26.4% to 4.2%.

This indicator estimates, under a random allocation of discourage votes, the combinatorial possibility that none comes from a permanent member and, therefore, is not an estimate of the real probability of a veto. Its fall shows that, as opposition increases, the set of possible distributions in which all discourages could come from elected members is reduced or, put differently, the number of combinations of Council votes in which at least one negative vote would have been cast by a permanent member increases.

The advantage she maintains over other contenders is now better explained by the regressions of other candidacies than by a strengthening of her own, which does not exist.

Rafael Grossi

He moves from eight to six encourage votes without managing to change the number of discourage votes, while no-opinion votes rise from zero to two. The round weakens his position, although without adding clear net opposition. He needs to convert his two no-opinion votes and reverse at least one discourage vote in order to reach the required floor of support.

In addition, it has circulated unofficially, although without public confirmation, that he faces at least two votes against him from permanent members.

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett

Until now she appeared to be Grynspan’s main competitor, but she is the hardest hit in this straw poll: her support falls from eight to five, her discourage votes increase from six to nine, and she retains one no-opinion vote.

Since the variations are net balances, it is not possible to state what trajectories the individual votes followed or to affirm that particular encourage votes became discourage votes. The combined movement is, in any case, clearly adverse: she would need to add four supports to reach the threshold of nine, converting her no-opinion vote and reversing at least three discourage votes.

Macky Sall

He keeps five encourage votes, but adds one discourage and loses his only no-opinion position. His result of ten discourages leaves a particular situation: to avoid a veto, the five votes of support would have to be those of all the permanent members. The combinatorial possibility of that distribution is only 0.03% under the assumptions of the indicator I use.

María Fernanda Espinosa

She is the only candidacy that reduces her discourage votes, although only from ten to nine. She keeps three encourage votes and adds one no-opinion vote. The encourage votes are very far from the floor of nine, so the indicator of the possibility of avoiding all vetoes remains very low: 0.2%, compared with 0.03% in the previous round.

Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett’s setback could benefit her, particularly if she can appear as a candidacy brought back into consideration should Grynspan and Grossi receive votes against them from one of the P5, a scenario I consider very likely in the case of the latter.

Olara Otunnu and Ivonne A-Baki

Olara Otunnu and Ivonne A-Baki are practically out of the race. Beyond any other consideration, both show more than ten discourages, 12 and 14 respectively. Since the non-permanent members are ten, it is a fact that both face discourage votes from permanent members: at least two in the case of Otunnu and at least four in the case of A-Baki.

This conclusion does not require the combinatorial model. It follows directly from the composition of the Security Council and explains why the indicator is equal to zero in both cases.

Source: author’s elaboration.

The full picture

The deterioration is not limited to the individual candidacies. We return to a logic of attrition and opposition like that of the third straw poll: the aggregate encourage votes of the seven candidacies fall from 40 to 31, discourages rise from 54 to 67, and no-opinion votes also fall, from 11 to 7.

The fifth round therefore shows a Security Council that is more defined, but also more adverse to accepting any of the candidates. The reduction in indecision is accompanied by a net loss of support and an expansion of rejections.

The aggregate trend of the fifth straw poll: fewer encourages and more discourages

The same seven candidacies participated in the two rounds, so the totals are directly comparable.

Category	Fourth poll	Fifth poll	Variation	Share in the fourth	Share in the fifth
Encourage	40	31	−9	38.1%	29.5%
Discourage	54	67	+13	51.4%	63.8%
No opinion	11	7	−4	10.5%	6.7%

Source: author’s elaboration.

These totals bring together 105 positions cast on the seven current candidacies and expose the general direction of the round: discourages come to represent almost two thirds of all votes cast, while encourages fall below 30%.

In addition, in the fourth vote the reduction in no-opinion votes had been distributed between new encourages and new discourages. Now the aggregate movement shows that nine supports and four no-opinion positions disappear, while thirteen additional discourages appear, which moves the general trend toward an increase in discourages.

Considering the seven current candidates only

Source: author’s elaboration.

These results mean that the distance of almost all candidacies from the minimum threshold of votes required for election widens.

The distance to the threshold widens

Candidacy	Supports needed to reach 9	No-opinion votes available	Minimum reversals of discourages needed
Rebeca Grynspan	0	0	0
Rafael Grossi	3	2	1
Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett	4	1	3
Macky Sall	4	0	4
María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés	6	3	3
Olara Otunnu	6	0	6
Ivonne A-Baki	9	1	8

Source: author’s elaboration.

The table above expresses an arithmetic possibility, not a political forecast. It shows how much each candidacy can obtain through the conversion of still undefined positions and how much each necessarily depends on reversing opposition expressed in this round.

Grynspan, as noted, is the only one who does not need to add support to reach the threshold. Grossi is still close, although I consider it very possible that he is facing more than one negative vote from permanent members and that he has little room to negotiate around his candidacy. For the remaining candidacies, it is indispensable to secure the support of countries that today express discouragement.

On latecomers and dark horses

Is a window of opportunity opening for a latecomer? The precedent of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar is useful for thinking about that possibility. Not because the 1981 process is equivalent to the current one, but because it shows that a prolonged deadlock can modify incentives and allow the entry of candidacies that until then had not participated in the effective competition.

On October 27, 1981, the formal vote began between Kurt Waldheim, who was seeking a third term, that is, his second reelection, and Salim Ahmed Salim. In the first vote, the result was as follows:

Candidate	In favor	Against	Abstentions	Permanent-member blockage
Salim Ahmed Salim	11	2	2	United States
Kurt Waldheim	10	4	1	China

Source: author’s elaboration based on the information in Berlin (1981c).

Both candidates exceeded the threshold of nine votes. However, neither could be recommended because of opposition from a permanent member. The deadlock lasted for sixteen votes. China repeatedly vetoed Waldheim and the United States did the same with Salim (Berlin, 1981b, 1981c; Security Council Report, 2026).

Waldheim withdrew his name from the following votes on December 3 and Salim did the same on December 8. The then president of the Security Council, coincidentally Olara Otunnu, promoted the search for new names and the use of a straw poll to assess their viability. Nine candidacies quickly entered the competition (Security Council Report, 2026).

That new list included Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, who can be described simultaneously as a latecomer and a dark horse. The first term refers to a candidacy that enters late in a competition that is already advanced. The second is used for a figure who is initially not very visible or considered unlikely, but who ends up emerging as a viable alternative, often because of the capacity to function as a compromise solution. Pérez de Cuéllar had not participated in the sixteen previous votes and had not carried out a public campaign comparable to that of the initial aspirants (Berlin, 1981a, 1981b).

In the December 11 straw poll, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan (an Iranian candidate, born in France) received nine supports, but faced opposition from the Soviet Union. Pérez de Cuéllar obtained eight supports and no negative vote from a permanent member. That absence of a potential veto proved decisive.

The result confirms that an ordering based only on positive votes would have placed Sadruddin first, although it was Pérez de Cuéllar who had a real path open toward election.

In the subsequent formal vote, Pérez de Cuéllar obtained ten votes in favor, one against and four abstentions, without a veto. Sadruddin gathered nine votes in favor, two against and four abstentions, but one of his negative votes again came from the Soviet Union (Berlin, 1981a).

That same day, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 494 (1981), which recommended the appointment of Pérez de Cuéllar for the period from January 1, 1982, to December 31, 1986. On December 15, the General Assembly appointed him by acclamation through Resolution 36/137.

Another lesson that applies to the current process is that the highest initial support does not guarantee selection. Sadruddin led the informal poll with nine supports, but was blocked by a permanent member. Pérez de Cuéllar began with eight, one fewer, but without permanent opposition. Viability arose from the combination of sufficient support and absence of veto, not from leading the count of positive votes in isolation.

Conclusion: a weaker leadership

The fifth straw poll preserves the general order of the competition, but changes its political tone. Grynspan remains first and continues to be the only candidacy with nine supports, although her relative advantage coexists with the loss of one supporting vote and a considerable increase in opposition.

The main novelty of the round is once again in the collective view: the Council again reduces its no-opinion positions, but that greater definition is expressed in significant growth in discourages. Grossi loses support, Rodrigues-Birkett falls back sharply, Sall becomes completely polarized, Espinosa improves only marginally, and the candidacies of Otunnu and A-Baki face negative votes from permanent members that can be verified by simple arithmetic.

The competition still has a leader, but one with declining support. The fifth round reduces the possibilities of almost the entire group of becoming the person who will head the Secretariat and may open an opportunity for a latecomer, as the case of Pérez de Cuéllar shows. However, we must be extremely cautious: in 1981 the compromise candidacy emerged after sixteen failed votes, confirmed cross-vetoes, and the withdrawal of the two main contenders, a situation that still cannot be verified at present. Incentives are beginning to be created, however, for other dark horses to consider entering the competition.

The next straw poll is currently expected to take place on October 16. According to Banjo (2026) in PassBlue, several Security Council diplomats indicated that the round is scheduled for that date and that it could use colored ballots. These would make it possible to distinguish the votes of the five permanent members from those cast by the ten elected members, although they would not reveal which country voted in which way. At this stage of the process, that differentiation is indispensable for determining which candidacies face opposition with veto power.